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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Ell\\r1\RD L. GILL~IOR, ED\\r.\ltD LESLIE GILL:\IOll and
l~. Fl{i\Xl~ IS GILL~IOR, JR. and
the lSI.~\XD RANl,HINL~ CO~I

p. \:\ \ . , formerly known as Island .
ln1proven1ent Company,
\ Case No.
Plairttiffs and Respondents, l
U993
vs.

l

ELWOOD B. CARTER dba SERV- \
ICE S.t\LT COl\1P ANY,
1
Defendant and Appellant.;

Brief of Defendant and Appellant

N . .~TURE OF CASE
Action by respondents to enjoin appellant's use
of' a road and counterclaim by appellant for damages
for respondents forcibly stopping appellant's use of
the road.
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DISPOSITION OF, CASE IN DISTRICT
COURT
The District Court entered Summary Judgment
forever enjoining appellant from using the road for
hauling salt or other minerals, but left for future trial
whether appellant had acquired a prescriptive right
personally to an easement over the road as a means of
access to the lake shore for exploring and studying the
mineralogical content of the lake and lakebed lands.

NATURE OF RELIE}, SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of Summary Judgment of
August 13, 1963 enjoining appellant from using the
road for hauling salt and other minerals and vacation of
District Court order of March 11, 1963, ordering appellant to cease use of the said road or in the alternative
post a corporate surety bond in the penal sum of $100,000.00 or the equivalent in cash.
STATE~IEN'l,

OF FACTS

Respondents filed a complaint on June 7, 1962,
to enjoin appellant from use of a road (I) 1• The road
takes off from the old Saltair Speedway, traverses
across land (some owned by respondents, some owned
by persons not parties to this suit) in a northwesterly
direction to the shores of Great Salt Lake and Ante·
lope Island. ( 1, 40) .
1. References are to Transcript.
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It is the only road to 1-\.ntelope Island and certain
state o\vncu salt lands \vhich lie off the southerly point
of .t\ntelope Island. (57 -58; 95-96).
~.\.ppellant

conducted a salt business from salt
produced fro1n these ~tate salt lands which appellant
lrased fro1n the state and hauled the salt from said
leased land on the road until forcibly prevented by respotulents' artned guard (15) damaging his business
to the extent of $~0,000.00. Appellant alleged that,
''Continuously and for a period of more than
30 years prior hereto the defendant and his predecessors in interest have used freely and openly
"·ithout restraint" ( 14),
the road~ and further that during more than 30 years
the general public has used the road, Salt Lake County
has n1anitained the road, and the road has been dedicated to the public use.
On X ov. 13th, 1962, after hearing, the District
Court restrained appellant from use of the road unless
he filed a bond in the penal sum of $2500.00, which bond
'vas filed. (35) .
On Feb. -tth~ 1963, respondents filed Motion for
Sunm1ary Judgment referring to certain portions of
appellant's deposition and submitting supporting affidavits of ''Tilliam Olwell, manager of respondent
Island Ranching Co., and respondents Edward L.
Gillmor ~ C. Francis Gillmor, Jr. ( 36-44) .
On Feb. 8th, 1963, appellant's attorney withdre'v
5
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from the case. ( 45) . On Feb. 19th, 1963, respondents
served notice of hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment for Feb. 15th, 1963. ( 47). Hearing was continued
to March 8th, 1963. ( 48). On March 5th appellant's
present attorney filed affidavit that appellant desired
him to take over the defense and after examination of
files was of the opinion that he "will not" have time (by
3 days) to adequately prepare to oppose the Motion
by March .8 and "\\rould need 30 days to prepare an
. . ('fq)
. a ff'.d
. l
.
.
opposition.
Upon t lliS
I av1t, 1earing was continued
until April 8th. (51). Thereupon affidavit by respondent Frank Gillmor, Jr., was filed stating that operation
of appellant's trucks through the land would destroy its
utility as lambing grounds, which lambing season is from
early March until May or June, depending on the season. (52-53) . vVhereupon the court vacated its order
continuing the hearing to April 8th, 1963, and ordered
appellant to show cause on March 8th why the court
should not act upon the Summary Judgment on March
8th. (56). On March 8th appellant's attorney filed
affidavit that he had ascertained from the State Land
Office that the road in controversy had been used by
the state whenever necessary to visit state salt lands
without respondents' consent and other lessees of said
state lands had likewise used the road 'vhich is the only
road to said lands for more than 20 years; that the
state also owned land on Antelope Island that has been
served by this road; and that it appeared that appellant
might haYe a defense based on an easement appurtenant
to the state lands leased by appellant fro1n the state;
6
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thut there should he discovery and opportunity to cross
t'XUiltitte respondents, as Inany facts 'vere within respotl(lcnts' peculiar knowledge. (57-58).
The court on ~larch 8th granted a continuance of
lhe hearing until .L\pril 8th, 1963, but exacted a heavy
pt'nalty. In addition to the $2500.00 bond that had been
posted by appellant, the court ordered that appellant
cease use of the road or post ''a corporate surety bond
in the penal stun of $100,000.00 or the equivalent in
cush.,, ( ~39-60) .

'rhe hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment,
after rescheduling, was set for August 6, 1963. Respondents also moved for reimbursement and damages
on the $i~300.00 bond at that time.
In the meantitne, respondents had answered interrogatories, the objections to which had been overruled
and appellant had filed additional affidavits of Albert
L. Thomas, ( 93-9~) , and appellant's counsel ( 95-105) ,
in opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment.

On August 1, 1963, appellant moved to vacate the
order of )larch 11, 1963, that appellant remain off the
road or post a bond or cash in the sum of $100,000.00,
and scheduled i?/W ~earin~ with the Motion for ~um
Iuury Judgment. This motion 'vas supported by his affidavit that he did not have the necessary assets to post
such a bond, that by reason of this order he had been
unable to operate his salt business, which was irreparably
damaged; that he has never damaged said road. ( 8889).
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Evidence l~roffered By Respondents To Sustain
Sum1nary Judgment - The portions of the appellant's
deposition relied upon by respondents is that at certain
times appellant had noticed gates on the road and that
there has been guards posted for the benefit of duck
clubs. That his only [previous] hauling of salt on the
road was fro1n purchases of salt from Thomas Brothers.
The affidavits of respondents, in addition to their
protestations that the road is a private road, aver that
there has been gates maintained on the road; that users
had closed the gates when necessary for the conduct
of sheep and cattle business. That for several weeks each
year the public is barred from the road by an armed
watchman employed by the duck clubs with the permission of respondent Edward L. Gillmor; that no
one had been granted permission to use the road except
the Island Ranching Company and various duck clubs
by virtue of written agreements with "certain Gillmars'' ; that there has been no use of the road without
the consent of respondents or predecessors in interest.

"Evidencen Proffered by Appellant in Opposition
to Motion For Sumrnary Judgment - The assertions
by respondents that the road had not been used except
by the consent of them or their predecessors in interest,
is denied. Not only is it denied by appellant's answer
and counterclai1n wherein he alleges that the road was
so used for 1nore than 30 years by appellant and his
predecessors, but by appellant's affidavits. The affidaYits specifically contradict respondents' affidavits
8
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that represent that the only salt hauled on the road is
"lin1ited qunntities", ''developed and transported under
lease ,vith the Gillmors". Affidavit of Albert L. Thomas
( U3-U-t) sho,vs 'rhomas used the road under claim of
right. t'rotn 1939 to 1953, to haul salt produced from
stnte salt lands leased front the state. During part of
this perio<l (1950-1953) he had a lease with son1e Gilltnors for land adjoining the salt lands. The lease from
the Gillmors did not provide permission to use the road.
"\nd the lessors were aware that permissive use pre,·ents easements. For in paragraph 12 of the Thomas
lease they granted a right-of-way across the uzeasedn
lund. (See copy of Gillmor-Thomas Lease (95-105) ).
Another lessee of the state salt lands was D. S.
\\"ycoff. 'I'he Wycoff lease wa~ from April 15, 1955
to ~larch 1, 1963. (95-96).
Hence from 1939 to 1963 the state salt lands off
Antelope Island were leased for salt development. The
lessees and the state used the road during this period.
It \vas last used for hauling salt from state land by
appellant until March, 1962, when he was forcibly
stopped by respondents.
One apparent reason respondents and their predecessors in interest never claimed proprietorship over
the road is that they did not and do not own all the land
the road trat'erses. ( 40). See also record in Salt
La~:e County v. Edward L. Gillmor~ et al. No. 137050,
District Court, Salt Lake County, which cause the District l"'ourt judicially noticed ii1 the instant case) .
9
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'

.

. (?!)

In answers to appellants Interrogatories respondents answered that Wycoff was granted permission to
use the road by written lease agreement of Oct. 27,
1955, between the Gillmors and Wycoff. This also is not
the fact. The Wycoff lease did not grant permission
to use the road, it leased 'Vycoff property adjacent to
the state leased land. It (as did the Thomas lease) only
granted a right-of-way over the "demised" premises
to haul salt produced on state salt lands . (See para.
14, p. 104).
With respect to the permission of the respondents
to the duck clubs to post armed watchmen, respon~I\ts
7
furnished a partially illegible agreement of 192f Hetween a "Gillmor Brothers Company" and certain
duck clubs, permitting the duck clubs to construct and
maintain a road through "various parcels of land"
owned by the "Gillmor Brothers Company" and ap·
parently maintain a watchman through the shooting
season. The only definite agreement by the respondents
referring to part of the road here in controversy was
a result of compromise in the recent case in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, Lake Front Gun and Reclamation Club~ Inc. v. Gillmor~ No. 117279. It also
appears that the permission given respondent Island
Improvement Company was a result of the law suit of
Gillmor v. Island Irnprovement Company~ District
Court, Salt Lake County, No. 56378 of 1937. (72-73).
Appellant was not a party to and hence not bound by
either of these suits.
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~,urther. the arJned guards were to prevent poach-

in.,· on Jutk clubs located on the right fork of the road
-not persons \vhose interests led them to the left fork
leading to 1\ntelope Island and the state salt lands.
\Set' Thorn as Affidavit 94}.
l""

~ \ ppellant found it difficult to obtain affidavits

t'ron1 people 'vho for various reasons do not 'vish to
becorne involved in the controversy. ( 96).

"'\fter the hearing of August 6th, the court entered
the judgment of Aug. 13th, herein appealed from. The
court enjoined appellant from using the road to haul
salt and declined to entertain appellant's Motion to
\"al'ate the Order of the District Court of March lith
ordering appellant to post $100,000.00 bond or cash
or cease use of the road, and indicated "said Motion
"·ould be required to be presented to the judge issuing
the order". But the court's judgment enjoining appellant frorn using the road rendered moot the Motion
to \"'ncate The Order of March lith.
ARGU~IENT

I
1,HE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EN'fEl{lXG St'")l:\Ir\.RY JUDGMENT ENJOINIXG . .-\PPELLAXT FROM USE OF THE
R04\.D \\'"HEX APPELLANT HAD PLEADED
~fll~\'f l~OXTINUOUSL Y FOR l\IORE THAN
30 \TE . .-\RS .~.-\PPELLANT AND HIS PREDECI·:SSORS HAD FREELY AND OPENLY
lTSED 'fHE ROAD.
11
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Summary Judgment should not be rendered if a
material fact asserted by a plaintiff is contradicted by
a defendant. Here appellant asserted such a fact. In his
Answer and Counterclaim he alleged that continuously
for more than 30 years appellant and his predecessors
freely and openly had used the road. Appellant respectfully submits that this issue should be litigated by trial.
Many facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of
respondents. Close and rigorous cross examination is
necessary.
It is not the function of Summary Judgment procedure to determine issues of fact by affidavits; but
only to determine if issues exist. If issues exist, they
should be determined by trial.

Christense·n v. Financial Service
101, 377 p ( 2) 1010.

Co.~

14 Ut (2d)

Disabled American Veterans v. Hendricksen, 9
Utah (2d) 152 340 P (2d) 152.
Fountain v.
Lacy v.

Filson~ 336

U.S.~ 207

U.S. 681, 69 S. Ct. 754.

F (2d) 352.

Saylor v. Fayette Plumbing_, Inc.~ 30 F.R.D. 176.
Thomas v.

lJlartin~ 8

F.R.D. 638.

Further, appellant has shown that credibility of
the parties is crucial. This makes a trial indispensable.
Arnstein v. Porter~ 154 F (2d) 464.
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II.

'r 111~:

EllRED IX EX'ri·~Hl~(; .Jl.l>(~:\IEX'l, ENJOI~IXG APPELI~"\ \"'r I~,l{{))l l~SE 0~., 'THE ROAD \\rHEK
t\ I, I)~: I~ I ~ ~ \ X' l,' S 1. \.~,I~, I D .r\. \.,.ITS INDICATED
~\\ ~:.\SE:\li 1 :XT '1"'0 USE 'l,HE ROAD APPl.lt'l'I1:X..:\X'f 'fO L1\.ND LEASED BY APPJ4~I.JI~.\~'f Fl{0:.\1 THE S'fATE .
I> l S'l,lt I l~'r

l~< >{ ~ lt'f

. \ ppellant reaffirms his position: Issues should not
he tried hy affidaYits. Contested issues of fact are a
ana tter for trial.
.. \ ppellant has not attempted to try its case by
ntfida ,·its. He desires a trial.
But nevertheless, it is no doubt apparent to the
l'ourt that appellant made a strong case of an easement
appurtenant to the land leased by appellant from the
state. 'fhis easement \\·as established by the state's
use of the road to reach its salt lands and by open,
adverse use of this road by state lessees from 1939
until 19H:.? ( :.?3 years), ( 93-9~, 95-105). The District
Court. although recognizing this, "·as troubled because
it appeared the lessees 1nay hav-e leased different parts
of the salt lands. But even if this be so, it would not
be significant "·hen the same road was used to reach
the s:une do1ninant tenament (state salt lands), and
the use of the road \\·as to the same extent-hauling salt
fro1n the dominent tenament.
Evidence "·ill sho\v the complete picture on this.
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Salt is taken from the water, not land. The lands en1braced by the Wycoff, Thomas and Carter leases were
utilized to some extent by all the lessees in flowing
and trapping the water to the spot the lessees had their
respective salt ponds. The site of the ponds were chosen
with reference to the lake level.

III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT ENJOINING APPELLANT FROJ.\;1 USING THE ROAD IN HAULING SALT WHEN IT IS INDICATED THAT
THERE \VAS A WAY BY NECESSITY TO
USE SAID ROAD APPURTENANT TO THE
LAND LEASED BY APPELLANT FROM
THE STATE.
Where there is a conveyance of land and no means
of access thereto, except over land of the grantor, a way
of necessity over such land is ordinarily granted by
implication of law. This principle may apply in the
instant case with respect to these salt lands which
became vested in the State of Utah in 1896 when Utah
'vas admitted to the Union. Such an application of the
law of easement by necessity would not be without
precedent. See Snyder 'l~. Warford~ II l\Io. 513, 49 Am.
D. 94. The defense was open to appellant by virtue of
his denial in para. 2 of his answer, and was argued
in opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment.
14
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IV.
'fll~~

DIS'fRilHf COL~RT ERRED IN EN'fElliXG ORDEit OF ~lARCH II, 1963, THA'l"
.\PPELLAN'l, CEASE TO USE THE ROAD
<>Ill)OST "\ llOND IN 'l,HE SU~I OF $100,000.00
<>It t'.ASH.
'rhis order to post $100,000.00 bond or cash or stop
using the road 'vas the penalty appellant had to pay
for a l'ontinuance. Continuance was necessary because
appellant's attorney, who had been handling the case,
withdre,v, nnd the substituted attorney could not prepure to Ineet the Motion by March 8th. '!,here was no
tnotion to increase the $2500.00 bond.
The order amounted to an arbitrary order that
appellant get off the road without the need for respondents posting a bond because appellant simply did not
hnYe the $100,000.00 in cash or assets. ( 88). Appellant had no other source of revenue other than from
these salt beds. ( 126). Appellant requests this court
to vacate the order of March lith and restore appellant
to use of the road pending trial.
Just ho'v responsible were respondents' claims of
d:unage can be judged by the affidavits they submitted
in support of their ~lotion for Damages under the
8:!500.00 bond. 'Villiam Olwell of respondent Island
Rnnching Co. pins the damage on appellant because
fron1 his window in the \\Talker Bank Building he saw
''dust created by defendant's movement on the road.''
\78). Respondent Ed"~ard Lester Gillmor avers it was
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necessary to replace one culvert, at cost of $68.69; cost
of gravel $I5.00; tractor and operator four hours
$56.00; total $I39.69; that it would be necessary to replace two other culverts; and attaches bills to respondent
Island Ranching Con1pany for $340.00 road material,
claims $140.00 for said respondents (cost of spreading)
and estimates of another $500.00. (79-80).
ask
the court: Note the insufficiency of these affidarits.
Respondents would have the court believe that only
appellant used this ro~~l. Respondents' use of the road
is not mentioned. Yet (as appears by appellants' affidavit) respondent Island Ranching Company used
heavy diesel trucks and semi-trailers carrying loads of
hay, grain, and cattle, of 20 to 25 tons per load, approximately 3 or 4 times the weight of any of appellant's loads, the culvert replaced had been damaged
by a road grader at the time appellant commenced
using the road; and appellant hauled approximately 200
loads of gravel and 'vith his own equipment spread the
gravel. {9"-9 i)

' re

Appellant submits that respondents' showing of
damage demonstrated that obtaining the bond and injunction as well as the order of l\1arch II th was harassment. Appellant submits that the District Court's order
of March 11, 1963, should be Yacated.

v.
1,HE DISrfRIC'f COURT ERRED IN DECll~~EING THAT THE DISMISSAL ''rJTH
16
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Plt~~JUDIC'J1~

IN 'fHE C'-1\SE OF SAL'f LAI\:E
COlrN'rY \rS. EDWARD L. GILLMOR ET AL.,
DIS'fltiC'f COUR1., SALT LAKE COUNTY,
DOCKE'f NO. 137050, W1\.S BINDING ON THE
COl~lt'l' .t\ND APPELLANT SO THAT APPELLAN1" l~OULD NOT MAKE USE OF THE
RO.i\D UNDER CLAIM OF PUBLIC ROAD.
'fhc Court took j udi~ial notice of the case of Salt
Lake County vs. Edward L. Gill~mor~ et al~ Docket No.
137050, in the District Court, Salt Lake County, where
Salt Lake Cotmty sued respondents seeking to have
the road involved decreed a public road. This action
was not tried but was dismissed with prejudice. Appellant \vas not a party to that cause.
It 1nay be that when a cause is instituted by a political subdivision and tried and decree rendered that
1nembers of the public n1ay be bound on the issue of a
public way, although of course they would not be foreclosed from showing an easement over the land. But
appellant respectfully submits that such situation should
not prevail when there is no trial. Dismissal, whether
with prejudice or 'vithout prejudice, should not bind
non-parties from showing a public way in such situation.

CONCLUSION
It is not the function of a proceeding for Summary
~udgment to substitute trial by affidavit for one's day
•n court and Summary Judgment should not be rendered if there is an issue of any material fact.
17
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
enjoining appellant from using the road to haul salt
should be reversed and the order of March 11, 1963,
that appellant cease use of the road or post a $100,000.00
bond should be vacated.
Dated December 3, 1963.
Respectfully submitted,
William H. Hnederson
711 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

